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donated would be substantially altered if the fund were divided
between the contending organizations.
The court stated that the rules governing charitable trusts were
applicable. The court recognized the judicial doctrine of cy pres
and said that where it becomes impracticable or impossible to ad-
minister a charitable trust according to its terms, a court of equity
will assume jurisdiction and, if a general charitable intent is
found, direct the trustees to administer the same to a purpose as
nearly like that of the original purpose as possible. The doctrine
was not applicable in the present case because of the specific in-
tent of the donors.
This case illustrates that the Arkansas Supreme Court strictly
construes the purpose for which public donations are made, and
if there is any deviation from the stated original purpose, then, in
all probability, it will be required that the funds be returned to the
donors. Such a strict construction would not be practicable, how-
ever, in the event a list of the donors with the amount of each
gift was not readily available.
Donald E. Snyder.
WILLS AND ESTATES
TWICE ADOPTED CHILD - RIGHTS OF INHERITANCE
Arkansas. In Hawkins v. Hawkins,' a case of first impression,
the Arkansas court joined the majority camp in holding that a
twice adopted child remains an heir and inherits from its first
adoptive parents. The question in the case was whether or not the
brothers and sisters of Jacob B. Hawkins, the first adoptive parent
of Clyde Eugene Brown, had sufficient interest to maintain a suit
to contest the validity of Hawkins' will. The decision was that
I .........Ark ...... ....... 236 S. W. 2d 733 (1951).
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Clyde Eugene Brown was the legal heir and the contest could not
proceed to a valid judgment unless he was a party to the suit.
The opinion discusses the two views that prevail in the United
States and concludes that the greater number of authorities and
the sounder reasoning support the holding that a twice adopted
child does inherit from its first adoptive parent. The basis for the
minority view is explained in the Hawkins opinion:
... [WIhen, by the second adoption, the first adoptive parents
were relieved of all legal responsibility for the care and education
of the child it would logically follow that the child would lose its right
of inheritance.2
The Hawkins opinion rejects this reasoning and states:
We cannot agree that this is sound logic and submit that it is con-
trary to the reason for the well established rule that an adopted child
does inherit from its natural parents . . . , because a natural parent
is likewise not legally obligated to support and educate a child which
has been adopted.8
Support for this analogy is found in other decisions. In Roberts
v. Roberts4 the Supreme Court of Minnesota decided that an
adoption did not take away the right of the child to inherit from
its natural parents. There is no more reason why a second adop-
tion should take away the right of inheritance conferred by the
first adoption. A Washington case, In Re Egley,5 concludes: "The
rights of an adopted child are fixed at the time of the adoption
and can no more be taken away than the rights of a child born in
lawful wedlock." The view accepted by the Arkansas court has
been expressed in many other states.6
The Arkansas Supreme Court dealt with the problem in the
principal case in a wise and learned fashion. Its opinion, which is
2236 S. W. 2d at 735, citing In re Talley's Estate, 188 Okla. 338, 109 P. 2d 495
(1951).
3 Ibid.
4 160 Minn. 140, 199 N. W. 581 (1924).
5 16 Wash. 2d 681, 134 P. 2d 943, 946, 145 A. L. R. 821 (1943).
6 The court cites several jurisdictions that hold in accord. Holmes v. Curl, 189 Iowa
246, 178 N. W. 406 (1920) ; Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993 (1896) ;
In re Sutton's Estate, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N. W. 925 (1925). See authorities collected
in 2 C. J. S., Descent and Distribution, p. 456.
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not of undue length, recognizes the split of authority on the point,
states the strongest arguments offered by each side, and properly
bases its decision upon the reasoning that seems most impressive
and appears to be in accord with the weight of authority. The
court is to be commended for its approach to the question. It ap-
parently relied upon the strong public policy expressed by the
Arkansas Legislature in extending every right to the adoptive
parents and to the adopted child "as if the child had been born to
the parents in legal wedlock".!
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL - PLACE OF SIGNATURE ......
Arkansas. In Weems v. Smith' the majority of the Supreme
Court of Arkansas followed a desire to effectuate the intent of the
testator rather than to adhere strictly and literally to the Statute
of Wills. The question was whether or not the testator had signed
at the end of the will. The court suggested that this was one of the
multitude of cases which must be determined largely in the light
of its own facts.
Testator committed suicide immediately after preparing a
writing wholly in his own handwriting expressing his appreciation
for services rendered to him as an invalid by Sallie, his sister-in-
law, who had been his loyal and faithful housekeeper for many
years. The writing, so far as material, was as follows:
... Sallie god Bless you
for being so Sweet & good To
Me this house blong to you
and every Sidney Smith (Signed)
every thing in it
Dear Sallie you was so sweet and good To Me
As can be seen, the words "everything in it" (referring to the
house) appeared after the signature, as also did the concluding
statement "Dear Sallie you was so sweet and good To me."
The majority of the court held the instrument to be a valid holo-
7 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 56-109.
8 . . rk 237 S. W. 2d 880 (1951).
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graphic will of Smith, written with a sense of impending death
and having other testamentary qualities. It was obvious to the
majority, as it must be to anyone who looks at the instrument as
a whole, that the words "everything in it" appearing under the
signature, form a part of the sentence before the signature. Thus,
there was no such intervening space between the provisions of the
will to suggest that the instrument was not signed at the end of the
testamentary disposition.
As for the writing at the very bottom of the will, since it was
not a dispositive provision, it did not affect the will one way
or the other. The court contrasted this sentence with an expression
in Borchers v. Borchers.' There it was held that an unsigned post-
script to a letter, "Papa, if I die for my country, I want you to
receive my insurance money. Goodbye.", was not a valid holo-
graphic will. This case involved a clause that attempted to dis-
pose of property, while in the principal case the clause did not at-
tempt to dispose of property. The Weems case falls within a rule
which has been expressed as follows, "The validity of the will is
not affected by superfluous or useless words which follow the sig-
nature." 10
The court correctly concluded that substantial compliance with
the statutory requirement that a testator subscribe at the end of
the will had been effected.
The dissenting opinion adhered to the literal rule, ignoring the
real purpose of the statute, which is to prevent fraud. Reliance
was placed upon statements made in certain treatises to the effect
that if the statute specifically provides that the holographic will
must be signed at the end, a will not so signed is invalid." But
these treatises cite as their authority either the Borchers case or
some case like it which is readily distinguished from the instant
case. Here the three words in question, "everything in it", are ob-
9 145 Ark. 426, 224 S. W. 729 (1920).
10 57 Am. Jun., Wills, p. 440.
11 ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) § 118; 1 PACE, WILLS (3d ed. 1941) § 370.
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viously a part of the sentence just to the left of the signature;
whereas in the Borchers case the entire dispositive clause appeared
after the signature in the form of an unsigned postscript.
The dissent states dogmatically that the will was not signed at
the end and fails to look at the will as a whole. It seems unjust to
apply a mechanical rule without distinguishing facts and circum-
stances.
CONSTRUCTION OF WILL- INTENT OF TESTATOR
Oklahoma. In Miller v. Hodges" the court took the basic con-
cept in the construction of wills expressed in the Oklahoma
statutes :"'
A will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator.
Where his intention cannot have effect to its full extent, it must have
effect as far as possible.
and arrived at an intelligent, fair, and correct interpretation of
the will of Edward J. Miller.
The question arose as to whether Ida May Miller, wife of
decedent, was devised a vested interest in the estate of Edward J.
Miller which she could transmit by will. The provision to be con-
strued was the third paragraph of Edward Miller's will, which
stated:
At the death of my wife, or if she remarry, then at the time of her
remarriage, I do hereby give, devise and bequeath all of my property
.. as follows, to-wit: To my son . . . 1/4 interest; to my daughter...
1/4 interest; to my son . .. 1/4 interest; to my wife, Ida May Miller,
if then living, or if deceased to her legal heirs, a 1/4 interest.
Ida May Miller did not remarry but died devising the 1/4 interest
apportioned to her to the children named in the above excerpt.
Plaintiffs were the legal heirs of Ida May Miller, who con-
tended that they had an interest in the 1/4 interest in the Edward
J. Miller estate. Defendants were the three children of Edward
J. Miller, to whom the 1/4 interest was devised by Ida May Miller,
They contended that the 1/4 interest vested in Ida May Miller,
12 .------ Okla -------------- 231 P. 2d 678 (1951).
1" 84 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 151.
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whether she remarried or not, so that she could transfer it to
them by will.
The supreme court upheld the trial court's judgment in.favor of
plaintiffs, saying that study of the will convinced them that the
intent of the testator was clearly expressed that the 1/4 interest
apportioned to his wife should be vested in her heirs and dis-
tributed to them at her death if she did not remarry.
The defendants contended that Ida May Miller was vested with
an undivided 1/4 interest because of the rule favoring the vesting
of estates generally.1 The court rebutted this argument by refer-
ring to the Oklahoma statutes which provide that a will is to be
construed according to the intention of the testator. A clear and
plain devise, such as here involved, cannot be affected by the
reasons asserted by defendants.
Reference was made also to earlier decisions, in particular
Munger v. Elliot," in which was stated the principle that all rules
of construction and presumptions are subordinate to the ascer-
tained intent of the testator. In Wilson v. Berryhill"6 the court said
that regardless of the technical definition of words used in a will,
if the meaning of the testator is clearly expressed, the latter will
be given effect in construing the will.
The decision in the instant case is clearly in line with the great
majority of decisions and authorities in the field of construction of
wills.' In Hordenbergh v. Ray" the cardinal rule in the construc-
tion of wills and codicils was said to be that "the intention of the
testator must be ascertained if possible, and.. .given effect..."
Atkinson 9 states the principle in a different way and says that
rules of construction should be flexibly applied so as not to defeat
the intention manifested by the testator in the will.
Douglas D. Snider.
1433 AM. JUR. Life Estates and Remainders, § 102.
15 187 Okla. 19, 100 P. 2d 876, 877 (1940).
16 181 Okla. 213, 73 P. 2d 449 (1937).
1, See 69 C. J., Wills, § 1118, p. 52.
18 151 U. S. 112 (1893).
19 ATKINSON. WILLS (1937) § 267.
